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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMIMSTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: David Sweet, 96-B-0121 
Altona CF , .. 
555 Devils Deh Road· 
P.O. Box 300'.0. '1 . ·i:.:, 
Altona NY 12910-2090 
Decision appealed: July 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-months. 
Board Member(s) Drake, Copp9Ia 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Let~er-b~lefreceived December 3, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
rsigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
iJ> l · ii . 
' 1 . • ~ . • 
/._. _. Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to ___ _ 
~d _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_ · Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommenda.ttion of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!.!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's ~ounsel, if any, on .~ 66 . 
Di~trihution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appcllam·s Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11ilO18) ;." . 
·,: ~ j 
· ,:'1: 
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Appellant was sentenced to 23 years to life upon his conviction of Murder in the second 
degree and Manslaughter in the first degree.  In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the July 
2018 determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 24-month hold following his 
initial appearance on the following grounds: (1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in view of 
Appellant’s release plans and the fact that he had no prior criminal history; (2) the Board 
erroneously concluded he lacked accountability and minimized his drug use while incarcerated; 
(3) the decision is arbitrary and capricious insofar as the Board relied on his disciplinary record; 
(4) the decision is arbitrary and capricious insofar as the Board relied on his claim of innocence 
and gave no weight to victim impact material in support; and (5) the decision violates due process 
because the Board improperly focused on the instant offense and considered matters outside the 
scope of the statute and applicable regulations.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
 In 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4). 
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  Notably, the 
2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review 
of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). 
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While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).  In the 
absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must 
be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990). 
 
Here, the record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board 
considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense wherein Appellant caused the 
death of his fiancé’s three year old daughter by blunt force trauma; that it is his only conviction of 
record; his institutional record including completion of ART,  and 
discipline reflecting recent struggles including drug use; and release plans to pursue transfer to 
Minnesota to be with family or alternatively reside in a rental property owned by his ex-wife in 
New York and work.  The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the 
sentencing minutes, an official DA statement, Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, 
and Appellant’s parole packet and letters of support therein, including a letter from his ex-wife 
who is the mother of the victim. 
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense involving the death of 
a three-year old child by blunt force trauma to the abdomen causing lacerations to her liver and 
pancreas, Appellant’s disciplinary record with very recent drug use tickets in various facilities as 
well as violent conduct and fighting, and his lack of accountability and minimization of his drug use.  
See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d 
Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 
228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017); Matter of Abascal v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 23 A.D.3d 740, 741, 802 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (3d Dept. 2005).  While 
acknowledging the COMPAS instrument scored Appellant as “unlikely” for re-entry substance 
abuse, the Board disagreed based on Appellant’s admission that he began using drugs in prison and 
for the duration of approximately five years.  9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a).  In addition, the Board 
permissibly relied on Appellant’s claim of innocence for the heinous crime.  See Matter of Crawford, 
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144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228; Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 868, 804 
N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the reasons stated in the decision are sufficient to support 
the Board’s determination.  That the instant offense is Appellant’s only conviction of record and 
he has release plans did not preclude the Board from finding, based other considerations, that there 
is a reasonable probability that he would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law if 
released and that release at this time would be incompatible with the welfare of society.  See generally 
Matter of Mullins, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698.  The decision also supported the finding that 
release would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law.  See 
Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). 
 
The Board also rationally concluded Appellant lacked accountability and minimized his drug 
use.  During the interview, Appellant attributed his drug use to the people he was hanging out with – 
the same people he stated he was around for many years – and curiosity while also indicating he 
convinced himself Suboxone was safe because no one had overdosed.  When pressed further on the 
root cause of his using drugs after so many years in prison and using in several different facilities 
despite knowing it was prohibited, he attributed his use to putting himself in an environment of risk 
and expressed uncertainty if it was curiosity and a desire to be accepted.  When a Commissioner 
opined that his answer was insufficient and speculated he would not have accepted it if offered by a 
participant in the youth assistance program, Appellant agreed.  (Tr. at 14-18, 24.) 
 
In addition, the Board’s statements during the interview did not render reliance on Appellant’s 
disciplinary record irrational.  While a Commissioner noted Appellant “really [doesn’t] have much 
disciplinary,” she proceeded to observe “but it seems like over the past five years or so you have been 
struggling” and then inquired about his drug use.  (Tr. at 14.)  The Board’s concern is supported by 
the record, which reflects three infractions for drug use at three different facilities in the five years 
before the Board appearance with the last infraction in July 2017 as well as infractions for fighting 
and violent conduct.  
 
The Board also committed no error by relying on Appellant’s claim of innocence that it found 
less than convincing.  “[T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given 
effect by considering remorse and insight.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).  Remorse and insight are relevant not only to rehabilitative progress but also 
to whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense.  Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 
A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007).  Thus, the Board may consider an inmate’s 
continued claim of innocence.  See Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704; Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 
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2010); Matter of Romer, 24 A.D.3d at 868, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 874; see also Matter of Crawford, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228; Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d 
Dept. 2006); Matter of Okafor v. Russi, 222 A.D.2d 920, 635 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dept. 1995).  In 
addition, the Board considered Appellant’s letters of support, including the letter from his ex-wife 
(the victim’s mother) that was discussed during the interview.  However, the weight to be accorded 
applicable factors is within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 
1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717.  We further note it is not the Board’s role to reevaluate a claim of 
innocence.  Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 
548 (3d Dept. 2017) (quoting Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 708).  The 
Board is obligated to rely upon an inmate’s conviction and assume his guilt in making its 
determination.  Executive Law § 259-i; 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 8001.3 and 8002.1, et seq.; Matter of 
Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476-77, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 707-708; Matter of Vigliotti v. State Executive Div. 
of Parole, 98 A.D.3d 789, 950 N.Y.S.2d 619 (3d Dept. 2012). 
 
Insofar as Appellant appears to raise a due process claim, an inmate has no Constitutional 
right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); 
Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).  The New York State 
parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” as Appellant acknowledges and 
thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of 
Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
 
As for the specific allegations, the Board complied with Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) by 
considering each applicable factor.  As the weight to be assigned each factor is within the Board’s 
discretion, it may emphasize the severity of an inmate’s offense over the other factors considered.  
See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d 
Dept. 2018); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719.  We nonetheless note the 
Board’s determination also was based on additional considerations. 
 
Appellant’s additional allegation that the Board improperly considered factors outside the 
scope of the statute and applicable regulations is without merit.  There is no record support (and 
Appellant identifies none) for Appellant’s claim that the Board considered “the imposition of life 
sentences of individuals convicted of murder or felony murder, and the consequences to society if 
life sentences are not imposed.”  The mere fact that the Board found release would so deprecate the 
serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law – as it was entitled to do – does not 
demonstrate consideration of improper matters.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of 
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Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719.  And any suggestion that Appellant was 
entitled to parole release after serving his minimum term is mistaken.  See Matter of Russo, 50 
N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982; Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 
493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003).  The appellant was sentenced to a maximum term of 
life, and the Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate 
notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. 
Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 
A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 
698 (2007). 
 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was so irrational as to border on impropriety. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
